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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are professors of law or jurisprudence
teaching at universities in the United States, with a
professional interest in the law governing religious
freedom and its development in the courts:
Patrick McKinley Brennan. Professor of Law and
John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies,
Villanova University School of Law.
Teresa Stanton Collett.
University of St. Thomas.

Professor

of

Law,

David K. DeWolf. Professor of Law, Gonzaga
University School of Law.
Bruce P. Frohnen. Professor of Law, Ohio Northern
University.
Alan J. Meese. Ball Professor of Law, The College of
William & Mary.
Michael P. Moreland. Professor of Law, Villanova
University School of Law.

1 Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of amicus
briefs. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or
in part, and no party nor their counsel made any monetary
contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation or
submission.
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Nathan B. Oman. Tazwell Taylor Research
Professor & Professor of Law, The College of William
& Mary.
Michael Stokes Paulsen. Distinguished University
Chair & Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas,
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Robert J. Pushaw. James Wilson
Professor of Law, Pepperdine University.

Endowed

Tuan Samahon. Professor
University School of Law.

Villanova

of

Law,

Rodney K. Smith. Professor of Practice, Sandra
Day O’Connor
College of Law, Arizona State
University.
Steven D. Smith. Warren Distinguished Professor
of Law, Co-Executive Director, Institute for Law &
Religion, and Co-Executive Director, Institute for
Law & Philosophy, University of San Diego.
O. Carter Snead. William P. and Hazel B. White
Director, Center for Ethics and Culture, and
Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Suppose a federal law permitted government
officials to enter a Catholic church and use church
property
to
distribute
abortifacients
and
contraceptives over the Church’s objection. A law
that authorized such commandeering of church
property would burden the church’s religious exercise,
even if government paid for the drugs and
compensated the church for the use of its resources.
By commandeering church property, such a law
would force the church to be complicit in activity to
which it has serious religious objections.
That is what the government has done in this
case. The Little Sisters of the Poor, an order of
Catholic nuns, object to participating in the
distribution of abortifacients and contraceptives to
their employees. 2 Although the government insists
that revised regulations of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) relieve the nuns of the
obligation to pay for these drugs, HHS still
commandeers health care plans created and
controlled by the nuns and uses them to distribute
abortifacients and contraceptives. State and federal
law treat these health care plans as the property of
the Little Sisters of the Poor. Thus, the Little Sisters
make the unremarkable claim that HHS
substantially burdens their religious exercise when it
Petitioners include other religious organizations and their
health care plans who are similarly situated to the Little Sisters
of the Poor. For convenience and clarity, however, this brief
refers only to the Little Sisters of the Poor.

2
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uses their property in ways that offend their faith’s
teachings.
The courts below in this and similar cases,
however, have fundamentally misunderstood the
nature of the burden created by the HHS regulations.
No one claims that the nuns are forced to directly
purchase abortifacients, nor is their religion
burdened merely because they have to complete
additional forms. These arguments miss the basic
issue in this case. Nonetheless, courts have
erroneously focused on the fact that the Little Sisters
of the Poor are not financially liable for the drugs and
that the HHS paperwork requirements created are
minimal.
HHS burdens the Little Sisters’ religious
exercise by commandeering the nuns’ property. HHS
threatens the nuns with millions of dollars in fines if
they refuse to cooperate in government efforts to use
their own plans in ways that they find religiously
abhorrent.
ARGUMENT
By commandeering the health care plan
created, controlled, and owned by Petitioners, the
Department’s regulations force them to participate in
distributing religiously objectionable abortifacients
and contraceptives.
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I.

The Department’s regulations burden
Petitioners’ religion by commandeering
their property and using it to distribute
abortifacients and contraceptives.

The burden imposed by HHS regulations can
best be understood though analogy. Suppose a law
permitted government officials to require the nuns of
the Little Sisters of the Poor to distribute
abortifacients and contraceptives personally to their
employees. The government would pay for the drugs
and compensate the nuns for their time and expenses,
so there would be no financial complicity in the
distribution of the pharmaceuticals. Further, the
nuns would be free to voice their religious objections
while
distributing
the
abortifacients
and
contraceptives. The government would even take
steps to insure that anyone receiving the drugs from
the nuns understood their religious objections. That
law would impose no financial burden on the nuns,
and handing out the abortifacients could be done
easily, requiring less effort than other regulatory
requirements with which Petitioners must comply.
Yet that law would place a substantial burden on the
nuns’ religious exercise.
Now imagine that the law, rather than
requiring that the nuns personally distribute the
abortifacients, allowed a government official to enter
the nuns’ facilities and use their medicine carts and
other equipment to distribute the objectionable drugs.
Again, the law would fully compensate the Little
Sisters of the Poor for their financial costs. The nuns
would be free to follow the medicine carts through
their facility denouncing abortion and contraception,
and the government would take steps to make clear
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that the Little Sisters of the Poor object to the
provision of the drugs using the nuns’ property. That
law would also represent far more than a “de
minimis” burden on the nuns’ religion. Rather, it
would directly burden the nuns’ religious exercise in
the same way as the first hypothetical law. It would
make them unwilling participants in the distribution
of drugs to which they sincerely and seriously object.
That this hypothetical law commandeers the nuns’
property rather than their persons does not change
the fact that they would be forced to be complicit in
what they sincerely regard as sinful behavior.
The HHS regulations are analogous to this
second hypothetical law. The Little Sisters of the
Poor have created a health care plan that they
control and that is their property. The government
seeks to hijack the nuns’ plan in order to distribute
abortifacients and contraception. The Little Sisters
have no financial liability for the purchase of the
drugs, but that is not their claim. They object to the
use of their property.
A. State and federal law treat employerprovided health care plans as
property of the employers, created
and controlled by them.
Health insurance plans do not spring into
existence ex nihilo, nor are they creations of the
government. Cf. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S.
882, 887 (1996) (“Nothing in ERISA requires
employers to establish employee benefits plans. Nor
does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits
employers must provide if they choose to have such a
plan.”). Rather, employers design insurance plans to
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provide employees with benefits as part of their
compensation. The health care plan of the Little
Sisters of the Poor exists only because the Little
Sisters of the Poor created it.
As a matter of state law, employer-provided
health insurance is a contract between the employer
and the insurance provider to which the employee is
generally treated as a third-party beneficiary. See,
e.g., Sw. Health Plan, Inc. v. Sparkman, 921 S.W.2d
355 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that employee was
third-party beneficiary of contract between employer
and its health insurance company); but see Cahill v.
Eastern Benefit Systems, Inc., 603 N.E.2d 788, 792
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that employee could not
sue as third-party beneficiary of contract between
employer and insurance company providing benefits
to employer’s employees).
In the case of employer self-insurance, the
relationship between the employer and the third
party administrator (TPA) is also contractual. See,
e.g., Multi-Craft Contractors Inc., v. Perico Ltd., 239
S.W.3d 33 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding dispute
between self-insured employer and its third-party
administrator as matter of contract law). Once
contracts are executed, they are a form of personal
property.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS Ch. 15, Introductory Note (1981) (noting
that law of assignment in contract “is part of the
larger subject of transfer of intangible personal
property.”).
Petitioners do not challenge the authority of
the government to regulate employer-provided health
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insurance in general. 3 Insurance contracts are a
heavily regulated form of property and “[h]ealth
insurance is one of the most heavily regulated
industries in the United States.” See Timothy S. Jost
& Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in
Consumer Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J. L. & MED.
395, 401 (2005). Rather, the Little Sisters challenge
the lawfulness of the means by which HHS has
chosen to exercise that power in this case. Property
subject generally to governmental regulation does not
thereby lose its status as the owner’s property.
In other contexts, federal law treats employerprovided health care plans as employer property. For
example, health care plans may be assumed in
bankruptcy and are treated as property of the
employer’s bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. §365
(2012) (delineating a trustee in bankruptcy’s power to
assume and assign executory contracts). Although
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), the main federal statute governing
employer-provided insurance, does not govern
Petitioners’ health care plan, this Court’s ERISA
cases illustrate that health care plans are the
creatures of their creators, namely employers. This
Court has noted that “[e]mployers or other plan
sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any
reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate
welfare
plans.”
Curtiss-Wright
Corp.
v.
3 There are, however, complex questions in this case over the
precise nature and scope of the government’s power to regulate
Petitioners’ health care plans under ERISA and the ACA. See
Pet. Cert. No. 15-105, at 11-13.
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Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). This is true
even though ERISA imposes on plan administrators
fiduciary duties to plan beneficiaries. 4 However,
“ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirement simply is not
implicated where [an employer], acting as the Plan’s
settlor, makes a decision regarding the form or
structure of the Plan such as who is entitled to
receive Plan benefits and in what amounts, or how
such benefits are calculated.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444 (1999). Likewise, this
Court has said “decisions regarding the form or
structure of a plan are generally settlor [i.e. employer]
functions.” Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96,
101-02 (2007) (citation and marks omitted). In short,
federal law treats employer-provided health care
plans as the creation and creature of the employer.
B. The
regulations
commandeer
Petitioners’ health care plans to
distribute
abortifacients
and
contraceptives.
There are many ways in which HHS could
ensure that Petitioners’ employees have access to
contraception without cost sharing. However, as the
D.C. Circuit explained, what the Department’s
regulations seek to do here is make obtaining
contraception “seamless from the beneficiaries’
In ERISA argot, “plan administrators” and “third party
administrators” are not the same thing. “Plan administrators”
are generally the employers who set up the plans. “Third party
administrators,” in contrast, are mere agents hired by the plan
administrators to process claims and perform other clerical
functions on behalf of employers.

4
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perspective.” Priests for Life v. U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human Serv’s, 772 F.3d 229, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
This “seamlessness,” however, is achieved only
because the government uses the religious objectors’
plans to distribute contraceptives. Under the
regulations, the TPA, an agent hired by the Little
Sisters and terminable by them, would process
employee claims to abortifacients and ensure that the
Petitioner’s plan distributes the religiously offensive
drugs. See 26 C.F.R. §54.9815-2713A(b)(2) (2015).
The only reason the TPA has a relationship with
Petitioner’s employees, or access to the information
necessary to provide them with abortifacients, is
because the TPA administers the Little Sisters of the
Poor’s health care plan. Thus, it is untrue that “the
acts that violate their faith are the acts of third
parties.”
See East Texas Baptist University v.
Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 459 (5th Cir. 2015). In this
context, the TPA is not some remote stranger, a
third-party unconnected with petitioners. Rather,
the TPA is the nuns’ agent, administering the nuns’
plan.
Some lower courts have suggested that the
government is not in fact taking over or using the
health care plans of religious objectors. Writing for
the Seventh Circuit, for example, Judge Posner
erroneously claimed, “[a]ctually there are no efforts
by the government to take over [objectors] health
plans.” Wheaton College v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 794
(7th Cir. 2015). He went on to insist that objectors
are “mistaken when [they] tell us that the
government is ‘interfering’ with [their] contracts with
[their] insurers.” Id. at 796. This claim, however,
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was mistaken, as the government has acknowledged.
In explaining its policy, the government stated that:
The Departments believe that the
third party administrators and health
insurance issuers already paying for
other medical and pharmacy services
on behalf of the women seeking the
contraceptive services are better
placed to provide seamless coverage of
the contraceptive services, than are
other providers that may not be in the
insurance coverage network, and that
lack the coverage administration
infrastructure to verify the identity of
women in accommodated health plans
and provide formatted claims data for
government reimbursement.
80 Fed. Reg. 41328-41329 (July 14, 2015) (emphasis
added). The “coverage administrative infrastructure”
in this case, however, exists only because the Little
Sisters of the Poor have created it. Without the plans
that they have authored and the TPA they retained
to handle day-to-day operation of the plan, HHS
would have to find another method to “verify the
identity” of claimants and access their data. As HHS
admitted to this Court, “If the objecting employer has
a self-insured plan, the contraceptive coverage
provide by its TPA is, as an ERISA matter, part of
the same ERISA plan as the coverage provided by the
employer.” Br. Resps. Opp’n at 19, Pet. Writ Cert.,
East Texas Baptist University, et al. v. Burwell, No.
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15-35.5
Government attempts to “accommodate” the
Petitioner’s religious objections did nothing to
eliminate these concerns. True, HHS claims to
relieve the Little Sisters of the Poor of financial
complicity. It is a non sequitur, however, to argue
that because there is no financial burden, there is no
burden of religious exercise. Indeed, this Court has
struck down requirements that burden citizens’
religious exercise even when those legal duties have
conferred financial benefits. See Thomas v. Review
Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that state
government agency violated Free Exercise clause
when it punished someone for refusing religiously
objectionable but paid employment); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (same). Likewise, the
employees would be notified in various ways that the
Little Sisters of the Poor are not paying for
contraceptives, see 26 C.F.R. §54.9815-2713A(d)
(2015) (“The notice [from the TPA to employees] must
specify that the eligible organization does not
administer or fund contraceptive benefits”), but this
notification does not change the fact that it is the
nuns’ plan that is being used to purvey
contraceptives to which they object. It is the use of
their property that constitutes a burden on
Petitioners’ religious exercise.
As noted earlier, ERISA does not govern the Little
Sisters of the Poor’s plan, but this does not change the fact
that HHS is seeking to use their plan to distribute
abortifacients and contraceptives to which they sincerely
object on religious grounds.
5
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II.

The arguments made in the lower courts
as to why HHS does not burden religious
objectors are unpersuasive.

The Tenth Circuit misunderstood the burden
HHS placed on the religious exercise of the Little
Sisters of the Poor. Its analysis focused on two issues.
First, the Tenth Circuit asserted that the
government would assume the financial costs of
providing contraception. See No. 15-105, Pet. App.
48a. (“The accommodation relieves the Plaintiffs from
complying with the Mandate and guarantees that
they will not have to . . . pay for . . . contraceptive
coverage.”).
Second, the court asserted that filling out the
paperwork required by HHS imposed only a de
minimis administrative burden. Id. at 48a. Other
lower courts faced with similar challenges to the
HHS regulations have characterized the burdens
imposed on religious objectors in similar terms. See,
e.g., Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 249 (“A review of the
regulatory accommodation shows that the opt-out
mechanism imposes a de minimis requirement on
any eligible organization”). This approach, however,
is misconceived.
A. It is irrelevant that Petitioners are
not financially liable.
First, the government purchase of the
abortifacient drugs at issue is irrelevant to the
question of whether the Petitioners’ religious exercise
has been burdened. The Office of Management and
Budget estimates that in 2015 the federal
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government will spend $1.1 trillion on the health
care of American citizens. Office of Management &
Budget, Table 15.1 – Total Outlays for Health
Programs:
1962-2020,
available
at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/.
These subsidies take the form of everything from
financial support for basic medical research to paying
directly for the medical procedures of millions of
citizens. Through HHS regulations, the government
has spent part of its health care budget on
abortifacients
and
contraception,
but
those
expenditures without more are irrelevant to the
nuns’ claims. The Little Sisters have not claimed
their religious freedom is burdened when government
behaves in ways that they find religiously
objectionable. Religious freedom “simply cannot be
understood to require that the Government conduct
its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the
religious beliefs of particular citizens.” Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
Contrary to the suggestion by lower court
judges, see No. 15-105, Pet. App. 91a, challengers to
the HHS regulations do not question this principle.
The Little Sisters do not claim that HHS burdens
their religious exercise merely because it pays for
drugs to which they object. Nor do they claim that
HHS burdens their religious exercise because their
employees might use abortifacients, which the nuns
believe to be sinful, at government expense. The
nuns sue neither to keep the government from
providing contraception to their employees, nor to
limit, by force of law, their employees’ ability to
obtain or use abortifacients contraception at no
expense. Rather, the Little Sisters sue to protect
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their religious integrity against objectionable
governmental commandeering of their property.
As long-time observers of this kind of litigation,
we suspect that both the government and the lower
courts feel exasperated that having been relieved of
the obligation to purchase abortifacients and
contraceptives, the Little Sisters of the Poor and
other
objectors
continue
to
challenge
the
6
Department’s regulations. But such impatience is
neither warranted nor a sound basis for legal
analysis. The fact that the government has avoided
violating RFRA by directly ordering the Little Sisters
of the Poor to pay for contraceptives does not leave
HHS free to violate RFRA by commandeering the
nuns’ health care plans. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (“By
requiring [religious objectors] to arrange for such
6 Writing for the Seventh Circuit, for example, Judge Posner
disappointingly suggested that the plaintiff, a Christian liberal
arts college, was lying when it claimed that it would have no
RFRA objection to the Department’s regulations if the College’s
health care plan was not used to distribute abortifacients. See
Wheaton College v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“At oral argument Wheaton’s lawyer said that his client has no
objection to the government’s using the college’s insurers to
provide emergency-contraceptive coverage as long as it’s not
‘using’ Wheaton’s contract with the insurers . . . . We wonder.”).
Elsewhere, in the opinion Judge Posner suggested that the
plaintiff’s real goal was to make it more difficult for students to
obtain abortifacients. See id. at 797 (“But it seeks to make that
access more difficult”). These asides were irrelevant to the legal
questions Judge Posner was addressing, but reveal an
unfortunate unwillingness to consider the nature of the
religious burdens created by HHS regulations.
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coverage, the HHS mandate demands that they
engage in conduct that seriously violates their
religious beliefs” (emphasis added)).
B. It is irrelevant that the paper work
required is “de minimis”
The Tenth Circuit and other lower courts have
also emphasized that HHS regulations require only
that objectors fill out a simple form. See Pet. App.
48a. They correctly observe that completing the
forms would take at most a few minutes and is far
less onerous than other regulations with which the
Little Sisters must comply. Compare Priests for Life,
772 F.3d at 237 (“All Plaintiffs must do to opt out is
to express what they believe and seek what they
want via a letter or two-page form.”). This argument,
however, misunderstands the nature of the religious
burden in this case. What is objectionable about the
HHS regulations is not that they require religious
employers to complete additional paperwork. The
regulations
burden
the
Little
Sisters
by
commandeering their property in the service of the
government’s delivery of drugs to which they
sincerely and religiously object.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental question in this case is
whether, despite this Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby,
134 S.Ct. 2751, the government continues to
implement the ACA in a way that violates the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act by forcing the
Little Sisters of the Poor to assist in the distribution
of abortifacients and contraceptives to which they
have serious and sincere religious objections. The
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answer to this question is less complex than it
initially appears. The Little Sisters of the Poor have
created a health care plan for their employees. It is
their creation and their creature. It exists only
because they created it. It is a creature of contract, a
contract that they authored. It is ultimately their
property. The government wants to use it because it
finds it administratively convenient to do so. The
Little Sisters object to having their property
dragooned into these efforts. The government is free
to pursue its policy of providing preventive health
care services, but it may not require the Little Sisters
of the Poor to participate in that effort “unless that
action constitutes the least restrictive means of
serving a compelling government interest.” Id. at
2759.
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